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SAME-SEX DIVORCE JURISDICTION: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CHAMBERS V.
ORMISTON AND WHY DIVORCE IS AN
INCIDENT OF MARRIAGE THAT SHOULD BE
UNIFORMLY RECOGNIZED THROUGHOUT THE
STATES
Danielle Johnson*
One of the benefits of marriage is divorce. For a lot of
couples, that benefit is very complicated and very costly in
ways that heterosexual couples would never have to
experience.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Margaret Chambers and Cassandra Ormiston are in a
bind. They were married in Massachusetts in 2004, shortly
after the state legalized same-sex marriage.2 In 2006, they
filed for divorce in their home state of Rhode Island, where
the law is silent on the legality of same-sex marriage.' The
Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the family court
*Technical Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 50; J.D. Candidate, Santa
Clara University School of Law; B.S., Santa Clara University. I would like to
acknowledge my appreciation and gratitude to all the members of the Santa
Clara Law Review for their contribution to the publication of this comment. I
also want to thank my friends, family, and loved ones for all their support and
patience during this process. Finally, a note of thanks to Professor Patricia
Cain for her comments on an earlier draft.
1. Dafna Linzer, Same-Sex Divorce Challenges the Legal System, WASH.
POST, Jan. 2, 2008, at A3 (quoting Joyce Kauffman, a divorce attorney in
Massachusetts).
2. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 958-59 (R.I. 2007) (citing
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (plurality
opinion)).
3. Id. at 959; see also Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-
Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
2143, 2165 (2005) (noting that there is no authority in Rhode Island on same-
sex marriage).
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lacked jurisdiction to perform their divorce because the state
legislature had limited its definition of marriage as a union
between a man and a woman.4 Under Massachusetts law, at
least one party seeking a divorce must live in Massachusetts
for one year before filing a divorce petition.5 Massachusetts
law, however, specifies that a divorce will not be granted if it
appears that the party established residency for the purpose
of obtaining a divorce.6 Now that the couple cannot rely on
Massachusetts or Rhode Island law, their options are rather
limited.
The extraordinary burden facing this couple merits an
analysis of how the courts can come to a more sensible result.
Same-sex spouses, who were married in states that recognize
same-sex marriage, face numerous difficulties when divorcing
in a state where the law conflicts with or is silent on the
legality of the underlying marriage. The increasing legal
recognition of same-sex marriage, coupled with a lack of
uniformity between marriage and divorce law across the
states, has prompted courts throughout the United States to
seek clarity and guidance when resolving these legal
disputes.
First, Part II of this comment will discuss the current
state of the law regarding same-sex marriage, the evolution
of those laws, and general principles and approaches
to marriage recognition.7 Part III of this comment will
introduce the problems posed by the current lack of
uniformity,8 and Part IV will analyze how these problems
should be resolved by discussing pertinent cases and use of an
"incidental approach" to marriage recognition. 9 Ultimately,
4. See Chambers, 935 A.2d at 962-63.
5. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 5 (1975).
6. Id. ("[A] divorce may be adjudged, for any cause allowed by law, unless
it appears that the plaintiff has removed into this commonwealth for the
purpose of obtaining a divorce.").
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV. An "incident of marriage" refers to a specific right,
benefit, or responsibility flowing to a married couple as a result of their marital
status. Barbara J. Cox, Using an "Incidents of Marriage" Analysis When
Considering Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Couples' Marriages, Civil
Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 13 WIDENER L.J. 699, 718-19 (2004) (using
an "incidents of marriage" analysis when considering interstate recognition of
same-sex relationships). Some have argued that courts should develop choice-
of-law rules for marriage by considering the particular incident facing the court
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this comment proposes that courts should use an incidental
approach to marriage recognition when considering a divorce
petition in order to avoid unreasonably burdensome, illogical
results.10
II. BACKGROUND
Issues of family law-including marriage, divorce, and
child custody-have generally been left to the autonomy of
the states." Accordingly, each state individually determines
the requirements of same-sex marriage jurisdiction. 12 Parties
in same-sex marriages, however, often act outside their home
state or move elsewhere, drawing attention to the problem of
the lack of uniformity of marriage laws.
The debate over same-sex marriage gained national
recognition in 1993, when the Supreme Court of Hawaii
handed down a decision appearing to indicate that the state
would soon recognize same-sex marriage. 3 This decision,
Baehr v. Lewin, produced significant concern among
Americans.' 4 Particularly, many people believed that if same-
sex marriages were legalized in Hawaii, "the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the . . .Constitution would compel every
other state to recognize those unions."15
In 1996, Congress reacted to the uproar by enacting the
federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 16 which declared
that same-sex marriage would not be recognized for federal
purposes. 7 Additionally, DOMA amended the Full Faith and
Credit Act to allow states not to recognize same-sex
for each particular case, analyze the policies behind that incident, and then
decide whether the couple should be viewed as marriage for that limited
purpose. Id. at 719 (citing Willis L.M. Reese, Marriage in American Conflict of
Laws, 26 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 952, 952 (1977)).
10. See infra Part V.
11. For an explanation of the reasons why this generally occurs, see Anne C.
Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787 (1995).
12. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME
SEX MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES 8-10 (2006).
13. See Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of
Non-Uniform Marriage Laws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433, 436, 445-52 (2005) (citing
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993)).
14. Id. at 436.
15. Id.
16. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
17. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 ("[Tjhe word 'marriage' means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse'
refers to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.").
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marriages from sister states.' Subsequently, states began
affirmatively reacting to DOMA 9 through the adoption of
their own so-called "mini-DOMAs," banning same-sex
marriage and declaring a public policy against its
recognition.2" Meanwhile, some states explicitly adopted
blanket nonrecognition provisions that refused to recognize
out-of-state same-sex marriages.2'
Currently, same-sex marriage is recognized in the
following U.S. states: Massachusetts,22 Connecticut,23 Iowa,24
Vermont, 25 Maine,26 New Hampshire, 27 and for some couples
in California. 28  Additionally, many other states offer some
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C ("No State . . . shall be required to give effect...
to any judicial proceeding of any other State . . . respecting a relationship
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of
such other State.").
19. See Grossman, supra note 13, at 447-48.
20. See id. (explaining that states embraced DOMA's "offer" to refuse
recognition and began adopting express anti-same-sex marriage provisions,
termed "mini-DOMAs").
21. Id.
22. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003)
(plurality opinion).
23. See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
24. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
25. On April 7, 2009, the Vermont legislature overrode the governor's veto
of same-sex marriage to become the fourth state to legalize same-sex marriage,
and the first to do so through legislative means. Abby Goodnough, Rejecting
Veto, Vermont Backs Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, at Al, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/us/O8vermont.html?scp=l&sq=Rejecting
Veto, Vermont Backs Gay Marriage&st=cse.
26. In May 2009, the legislature in Maine passed a same-sex marriage bill,
which the Governor signed immediately upon its passage in the Senate.
See Emily Doskow, Same-Sex Marriage: Developments in the Law, NOLO,
July 2009, http://www.nolo.comlarticle.cfm/objectID/6DF0766E-C4A3-4952-
A542F5997196E8B5/118/304/190/ART/. The bill would take effect in September
2009, pending potential challenge by public referendum. See Abby Goodnough,
Maine Governor Signs Same-Sex Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2009, at
A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/07/us/07marriage.html.
27. In June 2009, the legislature in New Hampshire passed a same-sex
marriage bill, which the Governor signed into law on the same day. See Abby
Goodnough, New Hampshire Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 4,
2009, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/04marriage.
html. The bill takes effect in January 2010. Id.
28. In 2008, the California Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage
with its decision in In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), but a voter
initiative subsequently overturned the decision. In May 2009, the California
Supreme Court ruled that the voter initiative was not effective for those
marriages that were valid before November 5, 2008, the day that the voter
initiative was passed. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 64 (Cal. 2009). It is
estimated that around eighteen thousand marriages were performed before the
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form of a legally recognized same-sex partnership, but
without the formal title of "marriage,"29 while others may be
on the verge of legalizing same-sex marriage. °
A. The Evolution of Inconsistent Marriage Laws across the
United States
Marriage laws throughout the United States are
inconsistent.3 Historically, "states imposed . . . restrictions
on marriage based either on the capacity of the individual or
the nature of the union," including prohibitions against
polygamous marriages, marriages of the insane, 32  and
interracial marriage.3 During the twentieth century, there
were several attempts to create uniformity in marriage laws.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL), founded in 1892, promulgated the Uniform
Marriage and Marriage License Act in 1911, and the Uniform
Marriage License Application Act in 1950.3' Neither attempt
succeeded because very few states adopted these provisions.35
Judicial action has been more successful at creating
uniformity throughout the country but has only rarely been
accomplished. Most notably, in 1967, the Supreme Court of
United States held in Loving v. Virginia that laws prohibiting
interracial marriages are unconstitutional. 36  Thus, Loving
prompted uniformity in this aspect of marriage law. 7
As of the early 1990s, all states continued to prohibit
bigamous marriages, incestuous marriages, and marriages of
minors below an age set by the states.3 ' At that time, "[n]o
state [had] affirmatively authorized same-sex marriage, but
initiative was adopted. Id. at 59.
29. See ARTHUR S. LEONARD & PATRICIA A. CAIN, SEXUALITY LAW 305 (2d
ed. 2009) (summarizing status recognition as of April 2009 for same-sex couples
in particular states).
30. See id. (listing states with possible legislative action in favor of same-
sex marriage as of April 2009).
31. See Grossman, supra note 13, at 436-37.
32. Id. at 437-38.
33. Id. at 438-39 ("All but twelve states [prohibited] interracial marriage at
some point in history. .
34. Id. at 440-41.
35. See id. at 440-42.
36. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
37. See id.
38. Grossman, supra note 13, at 443.
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very few expressly precluded it." 9 Despite the Hawaii
Supreme Court's decision in Baehr,4" Hawaii never recognized
same-sex marriage.4 "Other states, however, soon moved
toward [at least some form of legal] recognition of same-sex
couples."42 California, for example, provides same-sex couples
with a civil status equivalent to marriage.4' Similarly, a
number of other states offer recognition of same-sex
relationships in some form.4
B. General Principles of Marriage Recognition
Marriage recognition cases often involve the laws of more
than one jurisdiction, thus forcing the courts to decide which
law to apply by engaging in a choice of law analysis. 4' The
choice of law analysis is constrained by the common law
principle of comity, whereby the court considers whether its
jurisdiction will recognize the validity and effect of another
jurisdiction's judicial and legislative proceedings. 46  Most
jurisdictions abide by the principle that a marriage that is
valid where performed is valid in all other states." While
this rule usually means that an out-of-state marriage will be
recognized in all states, there are two well-established policy-
based exceptions.4
The first exception is that a state can refuse to recognize
39. Id. at 444. "Wyoming was one of the only states to expressly mention
gender in its marriage statute" before the middle of the 1990s. Id. at 444 n.52.
40. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
41. "While the case was being appealed, a state constitutional amendment
was adopted giving the legislature the right to reserve marriage to opposite-sex
couples." KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 8 n.15. See also HAW. REV. STAT. art.
I, § 23 (Supp. 2007).
42. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 8.
43. California offers same-sex couples the option of domestic partnership,
which is similar to civil unions. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 298 (West Supp. 2009).
44. For a state-by-state breakdown and comparison of statutory rights and
responsibilities of same-sex couples, see Am. Bar Assoc. Section of Family Law,
A White Paper: An Analysis of the Law Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, Civil
Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 38 FAM. L.Q. 339, 379-97, 414-16 (2004).
45. KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 13.
46. Grossman, supra note 13, at 460-61.
47. The rule, often referred to as the "place of celebration" rule, originated
with Joseph Story, who stated that "the general principle certainly is . . .
that ... marriage is to be decided by the law of the place where it is celebrated."
Id. at 461 (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §
113a (8th ed. 1883)).
48. See id. at 461-70.
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marriages thought to violate natural law.49 Polygamous and
certain incestuous marriages fall into this category."0 "Courts
have struggled to define the conditions that trigger [this
exception]."51 Some courts have applied the doctrine so
broadly that out-of-state law would hardly ever apply,
effectively ending all choice of law analyses.52 Although
states have reserved this exception for use at their discretion,
all states have banned marriages that have universally been
regarded as offensive, such as polygamous and incestuous
marriages.53 As a result, there has been little occasion for the
invocation of the natural law exception.54
The second exception is the express public policy
exception.55 This exception may be used where a statute
declares certain marriages void or invalid because such
marriages are against public policy of the state.56 This public
policy exception is not unique to marriage law, but rather,
can be invoked whenever a court decides a choice of law
issue. 7
Recently, in Beth R. v. Donna M., a New York court
considered these general principles and exceptions when it
allowed the divorce of a same-sex marriage that was formed
in Canada.5" New York's law is silent on same-sex marriage,
but the court recognized the marriage for purposes of hearing
the divorce petition.59 The court deferred to the law of the
jurisdiction where the couple was married,60 and observed
49. An exception thought to violate natural law is one "deemed contrary to
the law of nature, as generally recognized in Christian countries." Id. at 462
n.140 (citing Commonwealth v. Graham, 31 N.E. 706, 707 (Mass. 1892)).
50. Id. at 462.
51. KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 21.
52. Id. There is, however, the possibility that the doctrine would "displace
all other choice of law rules," so the doctrine is not often invoked. Id.
53. Joanna Grossman, The Difference Between Recognizing a Same-Sex
Marriage and Authorizing One: Why a New York Appellate Court Got it Wrong,
FINDLAW, Oct. 20, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.conL/grossman/20051020.html.
54. Id.
55. Grossman, supra note 13, at 463. This exception also referred to a
"positive law" exception because the policy must be expressly declared by
statute. Id. at 463-64.
56. Id. at 464.
57. KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 21 (noting that the doctrine dates back to
the Middle Ages when medieval authorities talked about "odious statutes"
whose jurisdiction was limited).
58. Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
59. Id. at 506-07.
60. Id. at 505.
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that New York courts have previously recognized out-of-state
marriages that could not have been formalized within the
state for the purposes of divorce. 6 Additionally, the court
indicated if there was no legislation regarding same-sex
marriage, then their decision could not violate the state's
public policy.
62
Even before the same-sex marriage controversy arose,
the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws provided a fairly
simple rule for handling marriage recognition cases,63 which
states that "[a] marriage which satisfies the requirements of
the state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere
be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public
policy of another state which had the most significant
relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of
the marriage."64 The state with the "most significant
relationship" to the parties will usually be the one where the
parties are domiciled.65 Determining domicile can often be
complex, as a person's domicile is generally understood as
"the place where [the party] makes his or her home and
intends to remain. '66 Cases often turn on this determination
because intention is "crucial to the question of whether
someone has changed domicile," and it is not always easy to
discern intent."
The Restatement rule is flawed in that it limits a state's
power to invoke the public policy exception to when the
parties live in that state at the time of the marriage." If, for
example, a same-sex couple is domiciled and married in
Massachusetts and they later move to a state that does not
recognize same-sex marriage, the new state will not be able to
use this rule because the same-sex couple lived in
Massachusetts at the time of the marriage. 69 The logic is that
it does not make sense for new residents of a state to have
entitlement to same-sex marriage, while it is denied to
61. Id. at 505-06.
62. Id.
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971).
64. Id.
65. KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. Id. at 19 (emphasis omitted).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 18.
69. Id.
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longtime residents of that state.7" Thus, the Restatement
"prevents the marriage validity question from being
repeatedly reconsidered" once domicile is established, but
gives "inadequate weight to the public policies of states that
do not want [to recognize] same-sex couples cohabiting ...
within their borders."7'
C. The Incidental Approach to Marriage Recognition
Many courts and scholars would prefer it if the choice of
law determination depended on which incident of marriage is
at issue.72 When utilizing the "incidental" approach, courts
"develop choice of law rules for marriage . .. by considering
the issue facing the court in each particular case, [analyzing]
the policies behind the . . . issue, and [deciding] whether the
couple should be viewed as married for that [limited]
purpose."73  Courts could therefore recognize certain
"incidents" of a marriage, such as the right to inherit a
spousal share, even when the court is unwilling to recognize
the underlying marriage. Moreover, courts have begun to
recognize that different incidents of marriage involve
different policies. 75  However, it may be "unacceptably
burdensome to require same-sex couples to 're-litigate their
marital status"' each time they request recognition of an
isolated incident of their marriage.76
The incidental approach was used in an English case to
recognize a marriage solely for the purpose of divorce.77 In
1939, an English woman named Kathleen Lawson married an
Indian man named Nawal Baindail in England, only to
70. See id. at 20 (noting that "Utah['s] ... very strong public policy against
recognizing same-sex marriages" would be violated by a "migrant gay couple
setting up housekeeping in Salt Lake City" just as much as it is by "a local
couple doing so after a weekend trip to Boston").
71. KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 95.
72. See Cox, supra note 10, at 718-29.
73. Id. at 719.
74. Grossman, supra note 13, at 470. See, e.g., In re Dalip Singh Bir's
Estate, 188 P.2d 499, 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (permitting two wives who were
both parties to a polygamous union celebrated in India to inherit equal shares
from their husband's estate despite the state's strong public policy against
polygamy and its refusal to recognize such unions).
75. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 93-94.
76. See id. at 94; see also Cox, supra note 10, at 718-22.
77. See Baindail v. Baindail, [1945] 2 All E.R. 374.
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discover that he was married to another woman.'8 Ms.
Lawson sought to annul her marriage on the basis of
bigamy."9 Mr. Baindail argued that potentially polygamous
marriages were not considered marriages under English law
and, therefore, even though he was married under the laws of
another country, he was legally single at the time of his
English marriage because England does not recognize
polygamous marriages.10 Although there was substantial
support for Nawal's argument,1 the court granted the
annulment because otherwise "this English lady would find
herself compelled in India either to leave her husband or to
share him with his Indian wife."8 2 Although the court did not
recognize polygamy, the prior marriage was recognized for
the limited purpose of granting the annulment. 3 The court's
decision articulates the repercussions of a "blanket rule of
nonrecognition," 4 where a state would ignore an otherwise
valid marriage from another state. 5 Such rules can lead to
"multiple marriages [as well as] . . . uncertainty about
spousal rights and inheritance."86
The incidental approach "protect[s] the interests and
expectations of parties to a [marriage]," while simultaneously
allowing a state to express disapproval of the underlying
marriages. 7  Parties, however, will continue to face
substantial uncertainty. 8 Courts will likely decide cases
concerning separate incidents of marriage differently, leading
to unpredictable results based on how a court will weigh
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. See also KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 92-93 (discussing the
Baindail case).
81. Nawal Baindail relied on British authority standing for the notion that
polygamous marriages will be completely unrecognized by English law for any
purpose whatsoever. KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 83.
82. Id. at 84 (citing Baindail, All E.R. at 347).
83. See id.; see also Application of Sood, 142 N.Y.S.2d 591 (Sup. Ct. 1955)
(denying a man a license to marry a woman in the United States after he had
entered a potentially polygamous marriage in India).
84. A blanket rule of nonrecognition would be a law that declares all same-
sex unions to be void outside of the jurisdiction that recognized them. See
KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 69-81.
85. See id. at 69-70.
86. Id. at 84.
87. See Grossman, supra note 53.
88. KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 93.
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recognition of the marriage against countervailing policies. 9
While states that refuse to recognize same-sex marriage
might be more willing to allow limited recognition of a
marriage for a limited purpose, the approach inevitably
produces situations where a marriage might be recognized for
purposes of divorce, but not for purposes of child custody or
another related incident.9"
D. Categories of Same-Sex Marriage Cases
Different types of same-sex marriage cases present
distinct problems for the courts.9' Cases involving
jurisdiction in same-sex marriage generally fall into one of
four categories based on the policies of their home state, and
the reasons the parties left that state.92 These marriage types
are "evasive" marriages, "migratory" marriages, "visitor"
marriages, and "extraterritorial" marriages.
"Evasive" marriages occur when the parties marry
outside of their home state for the express purpose of evading
their home state's prohibition against same-sex marriage, and
return to their home state immediately thereafter.94 These
marriages are invalid if they violate the home state's strong
public policy. 95 Determining the state's public policy is simple
if the home state has a mini-DOMA, but without such a
statute, the outcome becomes more uncertain.96 Sometimes,
the determination of whether a marriage is "evasive" is not
clear.
97
89. Id.
90. Id. at 94 (citing Reese, supra note 10, at 54).
91. See generally id. at 101-13.
92. See id. at 101-02.
93. Id.
94. KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 102.
95. Id. The idea behind this is that "states have the right to govern their
own residents." Id.
96. Id. at 103.
97. See, e.g., Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 958 (R.I. 2007). The
parties were residents of Rhode Island who traveled to Massachusetts to get
married, and immediately returned to Rhode Island. Id. at 958. However,
there was no affirmative law in Rhode Island prohibiting the marriage. Id. at
961-62. Thus, it is unclear whether they were "evading" a prohibition in their
home state. Id. at 958-67. See also Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't of Pub. Health, No.
04-2656, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 670 at *2 (Mass. Super. Sept. 29, 2006)
(involving a Massachusetts trial justice who found no "prohibitory positive law"
to exist in Rhode Island, and ordered a declaratory judgment be entered that
same-sex marriage is not prohibited in Rhode Island).
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When there is a mini-DOMA, courts are split over
whether to construe the law to forbid same-sex couples from
divorcing when the marriages were evasive.98 This is an
especially important issue because a few states, Vermont and
Massachusetts, for example, have residency prerequisites for
filing a divorce petition." Therefore, these decisions can
leave couples with extraordinary burdens when ending their
relationship because the courts have created unnecessary
roadblocks. Two Connecticut courts construed Connecticut
law as denying Connecticut domiciliaries jurisdiction to
dissolve a Vermont civil union and to annul a Massachusetts
same-sex marriage. 100 A Texas court declined to dissolve a
civil union, but approved the couple's division of property.'0 '
Iowa and West Virginia courts dissolved uncontested divorces
between two couples joined by Vermont civil unions.' °2
Contrary to evasive marriages, "migratory" marriages
occur when the parties enter into a valid marriage where they
lived (e.g., Massachusetts), but later moved to a state where
their marriage was prohibited. 0 3 "[A]bsent a statutory ban
on same-sex marriage, [a] state's public policy [is often] not..
clear enough to justify withholding recognition [of the
marriage]."1°4 Even if there is a ban, the strength of the
public policy will often turn on the incident of marriage at
98. KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 104.
99. Vermont has a six-month residency requirement, and the residency
must have continued for a year before a final decree is issued. VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 592 (2002). In Massachusetts, at least one party must have been a
resident for one year before filing the divorce petition. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
208, § 5 (2007).
100. See Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); see also
Lane v. Albanese, No. FA044002128S, 2005 WL 896129 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar.
18, 2005).
101. Cox, supra note 10, at 736 (citing In re R.S. and J.A., No. F-185063
(Dist. Ct. Jefferson County, Tex. Mar. 3, 2003)).
102. Id. at 738-42 (citing In re KJB and JSP, No. CDCD 119660 (Woodbury
County Dist. Ct. Iowa, Nov. 14, 2003); In re M.G. and S.G., No. 02-D-292 (Fam.
Ct. W. Va. Jan. 3, 2003)).
103. KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 106.
104. Id. "Recognition is also appropriate if a same-sex marriage in another
state has ended in divorce, and the divorce decree requires one of the former
spouses to make regular payments to the other, for either alimony or child
support." Id. at 108. If one of the former spouses moves to a new state where
same-sex marriage is not recognized, the new state should still enforce the
judgment. Id. The state does not need to address the validity of the underlying
relationship because "[aIll the court is being asked to do is enforce monetary
obligations." Id.
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issue.1"' "Some incidents . . . can be conferred by contract,
such as those involving inheritance or the ability. .. to make
medical decisions for his or her partner,"10 6 while "[o]thers...
can be conferred only by operation of law, such as the right to
file a joint tax return."0 7 If the parties could have achieved
the right through contract, under state law of the forum, then
the forum cannot technically have a public policy against the
enjoyment of the incident achieved contractually and the
right or obligation should be recognized.1
0 8
"Visitor" marriage cases occur when "a couple [or a party]
is temporarily visiting a state that does not recognize their
marriage."109 Although there are few examples of these cases,
some scholars maintain that such marriages "should always
be recognized," for all purposes."0 Arguably, "[a]ny other
result is inconsistent with the constitutional right of citizens
to travel.""' Similarly, "extraterritorial" marriage cases are
not frequently litigated."2  This last category of marriages
occurs when "the parties have never lived within [a] state, but
... the marriage is relevant to litigation conducted there."' 3
105. See id. at 106-07.
106. Id. at 107.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 107-08. Koppelman notes that "a state can simply call the foreign
marriage a contract and treat it as a contract under state law," avoiding the
question of whether the relationship will be treated as a marriage. Id. at 108.
109. KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 110.
110. Id. at 111; see, e.g., Exparte Kinney, 14 F. Cas. 602 (E.D. Va. 1879) (No.
7825) (finding that a member of an interracial marriage would have a right of
transit and of temporary stoppage with his wife through Virginia, even though
Virginia criminalized interracial marriage).
111. Koppelman, supra note 3, at 2145; see also Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S.
35, 49 (1867) (declaring that it is well settled that there is a constitutional right
to travel and that "all citizens of the United States . . . must have the right to
pass and repass through every part of it without interruption").
112. Professor Koppelman argues that since "these marriages were routinely
upheld" in the miscegenation cases, and if "public policy was not enough to
prevent recognition then, it should not [prevent recognition] now, either."
KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 112.
113. Id. An example would be when, after the death intestate of one spouse,
the other seeks to inherit property that was located within the forum state. See
Miller v. Lucks, 36 So. 2d 140, 142 (Miss. 1948) (recognizing an otherwise
prohibited interracial marriage only to the extent that one of the parties may
inherit from the other property located within the state).
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E. The Effect of DOMA and the Mini-DOMAs on the Marital
Rights of Same-Sex Couples
DOMA was a Congressional response to the Supreme
Court of Hawaii's decision in Baehr, which seemed to indicate
same-sex marriage would soon be recognized in that state."4
The proponents of DOMA feared that if Hawaii allowed same-
sex marriage, then the Full Faith and Credit Clause would
require recognition by all states."5 This fear was ill-founded
because states have always had the ability to decline
recognition of out-of-state marriages.116 The Full Faith and
Credit Clause has never been interpreted to apply to
marriage recognition." 7 Rather, it compels a state to enforce
a judgment issued by another state."' Therefore, DOMA has
no effect on a state's ability to create choice of law rules
concerning recognition of marriage.11 9 Although the Clause
has been enforced "only weakly with respect to laws," it has
been strictly enforced with regard to judgments. 120
Accordingly, the Clause has implications for divorce, not
marriage.12'
DOMA has a unique effect on marriage recognition
because it provides that a state need not give effect to a
"judicial proceeding" regarding a same-sex marriage. 2 2 This
"implies that all judgments in which the prevailing party
pleaded the existence of a same-sex marriage can be ignored
by other states." 2' To complicate matters, "federal law, as
114. See Grossman, supra note 13, at 445-52.
115. Id. at 436; see also KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 117.
116. KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 117.
117. See generally Patrick J. Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause to the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 38 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 353 (2005).
118. KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 117 (discussing the original intent of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause and concluding that since 1790, the rule has been
that "a judgment is to be given the same effect that it would have in the state
that issued it").
119. Id. at 123.
120. Id.
121. Id. (noting that since divorces were entitled to full faith and credit,
"Nevada ... was able to set itself up as a divorce haven for residents of states
where divorces were hard to [obtain]").
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006) ([a] state need not "give effect to any...
judicial proceeding of any other State .. . respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such
other State ... or a right or claim arising from such relationship").
123. KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 123-24 (noting that under this provision,
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amended by DOMA, withdraws full faith and credit only from
judgments in which the . court recognizes a same-sex
marriage, while continuing to require full faith and credit for
judgments in which the . . court denies recognition."'24
Thus, depending on what a court holds, its decision may be
"entitled to full faith and credit," depending on what the court
holds. 121 In drafting the DOMA, Congress apparently failed
to contemplate "any genuine adversarial proceeding" where a
court would address judgments as well as choice of law
decisions, even though only adversarial proceedings "can
generate a judgment entitled to full faith and credit."1 26
Although there are no same-sex divorce cases on point,
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins illustrates how DOMA can
complicate the dissolution of civil unions involving interstate
recognition and, assumingly, same-sex divorce as well.'27 In
2000, Janet and Lisa Miller-Jenkins were residing in
Virginia, and formed a civil union in Vermont. 128  Lisa
conceived a child through artificial insemination in 2002;
shortly thereafter, Janet and Lisa moved to Vermont. 129 In
2003, Lisa filed to dissolve the civil union in a Vermont
court. 30 After the Vermont judge granted Janet joint custody
of their daughter, Lisa filed another suit in Virginia.' 3' The
Virginia trial court ruled that Janet had no parental rights
because her claims were based on Vermont's civil union law,
which is not recognized under Virginia law. 32 Ultimately, the
if a drunk driver kills a pedestrian who is married to a person of the same sex
on a Boston street, and the surviving spouse wins a wrongful death suit, the
drunk driver could avoid the consequences by fleeing to a state that does not
recognize same-sex marriage).
124. Id. at 124 (emphasis omitted).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 126.
127. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006); see also
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
128. KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 114 (summarizing the facts and
analyzing the Miller-Jenkins litigation).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Janet argued "that the Virginia court was barred from reopening the
custody question by [the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)],"
which holds that when custody is already being considered in one state, no other
state can consider the matter. Id. at 115-16. Lisa responded "that PKPA was
modified by DOMA," and that "the Vermont judgment that Janet had parental
rights was a judgment. . . 'between persons of the same sex'" and therefore "not
entitled to full faith and credit." Id. at 116.
132. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d at 332. Had the lower court decision been
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Virginia appellate court reversed, holding that the custody
and visitation orders of the Vermont court were to be given
full faith and credit in Virginia.'33
Even though DOMA is "irrelevant to the question of
when and whether same-sex marriages will be recognized" by
the states, "the numerous state [mini-DOMAs] declaring a
strong public policy against same-sex marriage" are highly
relevant. 3 4  Almost all of the mini-DOMAs are intended to
address the "evasive" marriage, where parties travel out of
their home state to avoid that state's prohibition against
same-sex marriage, marry in a state that allows such unions,
and then return to the home state immediately after.'35 Some
mini-DOMAs are "clumsily worded," such that it is unclear
which scenarios legislators are trying to reach. 136  On the
other hand, the statutes may be so broadly worded that they
come close to blanket nonrecognition. 137 Courts can use these
"positive law" exceptions to declare a marriage invalid as
violating the public policy of the state. 38 Commentators have
noted that many mini-DOMAs depart from "conventional
concepts of comity and conflicts,"'1 39 and have opined that if
upheld, this would imply that "no parental right arising out of a same-sex
marriage is secure in the United States." KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 116.
133. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d at 332.
134. KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 137 (emphasis omitted).
135. See id. at 139-40 (noting that a state can permissibly decline to
recognize such marriages because 'the evasion cases ... are the strongest cases
for nonrecognition"); see also Koppelman, supra note 3, at 2145.
136. KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 140.
Some specify that . . . marriages are invalid within the jurisdiction,
which leaves open the status of couples outside the state. Others deem
them contrary to the state's public policy, but it is not ... clear whether
that public policy is so strong that the state will attempt to apply it to
transactions... involving nondomiciliaries.
Id. at 140. See e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (2006) ("[a] marriage entered into
by persons of the same sex, either under common law or under statute, that is
recognized by another state or foreign jurisdiction is void in this state."); 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/213-1 (1999) ("A marriage between [two] individuals of the
same sex is contrary to the public policy of this State.").
137. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-1-19(e) (1998) (stating that Alabama "shall not
recognize as valid any marriage of parties of the same sex that occurred or was
alleged or have occurred as a result of the law of any jurisdiction").
138. A "positive law" exception refers to a statute that expressly declares
certain marriages void or invalid as being against the public policy of the state.
See Grossman, supra note 13, at 463-64; see also supra note 55 and
accompanying text.
139. See Grossman, supra note 13, at 478 (discussing how a state's law
"declar[ing] certain marriages invalid regardless of where the parties were
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courts were to address the constitutionality of these mini-
DOMAs, many would likely find them unconstitutional. 140
In states without mini-DOMAs, the outcomes of marriage
recognition cases are unpredictable.' 4 ' Absent a clear ban on
same-sex marriage, it is unclear how the public policy of the
state should be manifested. 4 2  Langan v. St. Vincent's
Hospital illustrates this point well, and presents a strong case
for recognition in the absence of a mini-DOMA.' There, the
same-sex couple resided in New York, but established a civil
union in Vermont.144 After his partner died, the plaintiff
sought recognition as a "spouse" for purposes of a wrongful
death suit he brought in New York, and the trial court held
that the case could proceed, noting that New York had no
policy against same-sex marriage, and thus no basis for
refusing recognition. 145 In coming to this conclusion, the court
utilized the incidental approach to marriage recognition,
explaining that "the court will not determine whether
plaintiff has a valid marriage in the State of New York for all
purposes, but only whether he may be considered a spouse for
purposes of the wrongful death statute.' 1 46  Additionally,
since there was no New York law that prevented the court
from recognizing the civil union, the court looked to the
purpose behind Vermont's civil union statute and determined
that Vermont does not distinguish between civil unions and
marriages.14' Thus, the plaintiff would be recognized as a
spouse in Vermont, entitling him to recover in his wrongful
death action.148  The only issue remaining before the court
was whether New York would recognize a spouse from a
domiciled at the time the marriage was celebrated is entirely inconsistent with
the Second Restatement's approach to conflict of laws").
140. Id. at 479 (noting that if DOMA was found to be invalid as a violation of
equal protection or due process, or that it was invalid as exceeding Congress'
power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, that decision could have a ripple
effect on the mini-DOMAs); see also KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 126-48
(extending the discussion of the unconstitutionality of DOMA and the effect of
the mini-DOMAs).
141. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 103.
142. Id.
143. Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sup. Ct. 2003), rev'd,
802 N.Y.S.2d 476 (App. Div. 2005).
144. Id. at 412.
145. Id. at 418, 422.
146. Id. at 415.
147. Id. at 418.
148. Id.
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sister state's common law marriage .' The court looked to
the legislative intent behind New York's wrongful death
statute, concluded that the plaintiff fell within the meaning
intended for the term "spouse," and determined that the
plaintiff was entitled to recovery.1 5' Although this case was
ultimately reversed on appeal, 151  it highlights the
unpredictability of marriage recognition cases in the absence
of an express statute.
F. Chambers v. Ormiston
Margaret Chambers and Cassandra Ormiston were
Rhode Island residents who were married in Massachusetts
in May 2004.152 The two women thereafter returned to Rhode
Island, where they resided together until the couple decided
to dissolve their marriage. 53 After the couple brought their
claim to the Rhode Island Family Court, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court considered whether the family court had
subject matter jurisdiction to grant the petition for divorce of
a same-sex couple legally married under the law of
Massachusetts.14 In December 2007, the court held that the
family court may not recognize the marriage for the purpose
of entertaining the divorce petition.'
The majority's opinion was based entirely on its
interpretation of the word "marriage," in the context of Rhode
149. Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411, 418 (Sup. Ct. 2003),
rev'd, 802 N.Y.S.2d 476 (App. Div. 2005).
150. Id. at 419-20. The court found that the plaintiff was the person "most
likely to have expected support and to have suffered pecuniary injury" within
the meaning of the wrongful death statute. Id. at 419.
151. The New York Court of Appeals relied on the plain language of the New
York wrongful death statute, which limited recovery to a surviving spouse. Id.
at 476. Because the Vermont Supreme Court "had not equated civil unions with
heterosexual marriage," and New York law does not recognize civil unions, the
plaintiff could not be considered married per se, and therefore, could not be
considered a spouse. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 99-100 (citing Langan,
802 N.Y.S.2d at 476). The judges "[found] it decisive that Vermont [did not]
regard the relationship as a marriage," but rather as a civil union. Id. at 100.
In essence, the appellate court did not even consider the principles of marriage
recognition because the relationship was a civil union. Langan, 802 N.Y.S.2d at
483.
152. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 958 (R.I. 2007).
153. Id. Ms. Chambers filed a petition for divorce in the Rhode Island
Family Court on October 23, 2006; Ms. Ormiston filed her answer and
counterclaim on October 27, 2006. Id. at 959.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 967.
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Island's divorce jurisdiction statute.156  It looked to the
original intent of the statute, and interpreted the ordinary
meaning of "marriage" at the time of the statute's enactment
in 1961.157 The court determined that the statute was
unambiguous and therefore looked to legislative intent and
various dictionaries published or revised around 1961.18
These sources indicated or referred to "marriage" as the
union between a man and a woman. 5 9 Therefore, the court
concluded that the family court lacked jurisdiction to
entertain the divorce petition. 6 °
The dissent, on the other hand, argued that the family
court had jurisdiction to hear the divorce petition, whether or
not their marriage was legally valid in Rhode Island, because
the parties were validly married under Massachusetts law. 161
Criticizing the majority for employing such formal rules of
interpretation, the dissent analyzed the broad objectives of
the statute and "common sense of the situation" to conclude
that the legislators at the time of the enactment of the statute
would have intended to provide to all Rhode Island citizens
with "a comprehensive forum for resolving issues concerning
marital relations."1 62 Additionally, since the parties did not
challenge the validity of the marriage, the court could have
conferred jurisdiction without having to determine the
legality of the underlying marriage. 161 In other words, the
dissent argued that the court incorrectly focused on the
underlying marriage, when it should have focused on what
the parties were asking for-a divorce.
156. Id. at 961-63. The statute reads in pertinent part: "There is hereby
established a family court . . . to hear and determine all petitions for divorce
from the bond of marriage." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-3(a) (1956).
157. Chambers, 935 A.2d at 961-63.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 962.
160. Id. at 963. The court notes that the same result would have been
reached had the statute been ambiguous and certain canons of statutory
construction utilized. Id. at 963-65.
161. Id. at 968-69 (Suttell, J., dissenting) (citing Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't of
Pub. Health, No. 04-2656, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 670 at *15 (Mass. Super.
Sept. 29, 2006)).
162. Id. at 971, 973-74.
163. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 973-74 (R.I. 2007) (Suttell, J.,
dissenting).
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III. CONFLICTING MARRIAGE LAWS ACROSS THE
STATES PLACE EXTREME BURDENS ON SAME-SEX
DIVORCES
To procure a divorce decree in Massachusetts, Ms.
Chambers or Ms. Ormiston would have to establish residency
in that state for one year.164 Even if one of the women moved,
the Massachusetts courts may disallow the divorce if it found
that the parties established residency solely for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce. 165 If only one of the parties established
residency, "the Massachusetts courts [would] not have
jurisdiction to award alimony or an equitable division of
property" because, to do so, both parties must be domiciled in
Massachusetts.'66 State imposition of such regimes is unduly
burdensome to the couple trying to obtain a divorce.
Similarly, blanket nonrecognition of same-sex marriage
produces unreasonable burdens on same-sex spouses. 167 By
refusing to recognize these marriages, states allow parties to
flee in order to avoid obligations arising from their divorce,
may allow some to people marry multiple times, and may
deny a parent to avoid child support obligations.168 Parties to
a marriage could dissolve a marriage in one state and avoid
obligations to account for marital assets by residing in
another. 69  Nonrecognition can create havens for those
avoiding support or property obligations arising from lawful
marriages. 7 ° Additionally, "[a] same-sex spouse could marry
again in another state without having to dissolve the earlier
marriage or even having to disclose [that marriage] to the
new spouse."' 7' Such a scenario would effectively legalize a
form of bigamy.'7' Lastly, a parent in a same-sex relationship
who is not the biological parent could flee to another state if
he or she wanted to avoid child support obligations or the
enforcement of parental rights.'73 These are but a few of the
164. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 5 (2007).
165. See id.
166. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 72.
167. See id. at 70.
168. See id. at 71-74.
169. Id. at 71.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 74; see, e.g., Baindail v. Baindail, [1945] 2 All E.R. 374.
172. KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 74; see, e.g., Baindail, 2 All E.R. at 374.
173. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 73-74.
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unfortunate scenarios that could result from blanket
nonrecogntion of same-sex marriage.
Such predicaments create uncertainty for couples who
were legally married outside of their state of current
residence should they desire to terminate their relationship
in the future. As Justice Robert Jackson stated in 1948, "[i]f
there is one thing that the people are entitled to expect from
their lawmakers, it is rules of law that will enable individuals
to tell whether they are married and, if so, to whom."17 4 A
couple who has entered into a good faith, legal marriage in
one state should not have to doubt whether their marriage
will be given recognition in another state, particularly in
their home state.175 For many same-sex couples, the ability to
dissolve the relationship is an important component of
recognition.1 7
6
IV. ANALYSIS
If a court with proper jurisdiction is presented with a
divorce petition from a same-sex couple that was validly
married in another state, then that court should perform the
divorce. When the law of the forum state conflicts, with or is
silent on, the legality of the underlying marriage, the court
can use an incidental approach to marriage recognition and
consider the divorce as an incident of that marriage.17 7 By
recognizing the marriage for the limited purpose of the
174. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 553 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
175. See Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 974 (R.I. 2007) (Suttell, J.,
dissenting) ("[W]e believe [entertaining a divorce petition] to be consistent with
the expectations of those Rhode Island residents who have in good faith entered
into same-sex marriages in Massachusetts.").
176. See Brenda Cossman, Betwixt and Between Recognition: Migrating
Same-Sex Marriages and the Turn Towards the Private, 71 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 153, 161-64 (2008). For some, the legal recognition of divorce is part of
the process of relationship recognition:
[Wihen our marriages don't work, I hope we insist on proper
divorces .. .because we deserve to honor our unions with this
validation too. We deserve help breaking up households and
navigating custody of children. Just as we insist on the right to
marry, we have to demand that the legal system help us dissolve
our unions when we have to.
Id. at 163 (citing Kathy Anderson, My Vermont Divorce, ADVOCATE, Sept. 28,
2004, at 10).
177. See Cox, supra note 10, at 718-19 (discussing an incidental approach to
marriage recognition); see also Hema Hill Kay, Same-Sex Divorce in the Conflict
of Laws, 15 K.C.L.J. 63, 71 (2004).
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divorce, the court can confine its consideration of the
relationship so as to avoid addressing the validity of the
underlying marriage. 7 ' The ability to legally end a marriage
validly performed in another state is an incident of that
marriage that should be available uniformly across the states,
regardless of whether that state disagrees with the
underlying marriage. 179  Parties seeking an uncontested
dissolution of their union are not asking the court to validate
the union; they are simply asking the court to dissolve it.'" °
By refusing to perform a divorce in a same-sex couple's home
state, some states have made it incredibly burdensome for
that couple to legally end their relationship.'"' Chambers
provides an example of such burdens because Rhode Island
refused to hear the divorce petition.8 2
A. Options Available to the Courts to Apply a More Sensible
Standard
Courts can apply various commonly accepted principles of
marriage recognition when determining divorce jurisdiction
over same-sex couples married in other states. 8 3  When a
state has no affirmative law regarding the underlying
marriage, principles of comity suggest that the state should
respect the decision of another state to legalize a marriage.'84
Using the place of celebration rule, the state can defer
questions regarding the validity of a marriage to the law of
178. See Cox, supra note 10, at 718-46.
179. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 105.
180. See Kay, supra note 177, at 89; see also Rosengarten v. Downes, 802
A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
181. If a same-sex couple who married in Massachusetts and subsequently
relocated to Washington wishes to separate, the parties can only get a divorce
through the Massachusetts court because Washington does not recognize their
marriage. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 71-72. The parties would have to
move back to Massachusetts, establish domicile there, and take a resulting
divorce decree back to Washington to have that state award support and divide
property. Id.
182. See Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 958 (R.I. 2007). After the
ruling, Cassandra Ormiston stated: "There is now no way for me to get divorced
unless I move back to Massachusetts, establish residency and then wait a year
before I file, and I simply will not do that." Dafna Linzer, Same-Sex Divorce
Challenges the Legal System, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2008, at A3.
183. See Grossman, supra note 53.
184. Grossman, supra note 13, at 460-61 (discussing use of the principle of
comity when recognizing marriages absent a statute declaring a public policy
against the marriage).
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state that performed the marriage."' Additionally, the court
considering the divorce petition can look to its case law to
determine if other forms of marriage were recognized in the
past-marriages that would not otherwise have been
performed in that state.186
Where an affirmative law declaring a public policy
against same-sex marriage exists, courts can use the
incidental approach to recognize the marriage for the limited
purpose of performing the divorce. 87 Under this approach,
the same relationship can be analyzed in different contexts,
depending on the policies behind the particular incident at
issue. 188 When considering divorce, however, it is likely that a
state's policies and concerns will favor entertaining a divorce
petition among the state's domiciliaries' 89 Parties that are
domiciled in a state generally own property in that state; so,
the state will have proper jurisdiction over both parties, such
that child or spousal support may be awarded. 9 ° This would
significantly simplify the divorce.
Instead of basing all decisions on a reluctance to accept
same-sex marriages, the courts should be more concerned
with providing assistance to its citizens than with politics.' 9 '
Divorce is generally a difficult ordeal, and imposing
additional burdens on the parties is unnecessary when the
relationship could be resolved.' 92 States like West Virginia
185. See e.g., Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 2008)
(deferring question regarding the validity of a Canadian same-sex marriage to
the law of the place of celebration).
186. See id. at 505-06 (noting that New York has validated incestuous,
underage, and adulterous marriages).
187. See generally Cox, supra note 10, for a thorough discussion of the
application of this approach to same-sex dissolution cases. See also Kay, supra
note 177, at 71. There is no reason why the incidental approach cannot be used
when the law of the forum state is silent on the same-sex marriage issue. See
Cox, supra note 10, at 753-54 (discussing how a New York court used an
incidents of marriage analysis to recognize a civil union when New York's law
was silent on the matter).
188. See Cox, supra note 10, at 719.
189. See Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 973-74 (R.I. 2007) (Suttell, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the purpose behind the divorce jurisdiction statute
was to give all Rhode Island citizens a means of determining their marital
status); see also KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 72 (noting that a court will not
be able to divide property or award support if they do not have proper
jurisdiction over the parties).
190. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 72.
191. See Cox, supra note 10, at 734-35.
192. See id. at 732-34.
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and Iowa have evidenced their concern with the welfare of
their residents. 9 3  Courts in those states have granted
dissolutions of civil unions.'94 Although the issues involved
when dissolving civil unions are not identical to those
involved in same-sex marriage cases, the state courts indicate
an increased concern with the welfare of its citizens. When
defending his decision, a district court judge from Iowa
stated, "[Wie can't turn people away from our court system
and say we can't resolve your disputes . . . I clearly look at
this as a dispute between parties that in some way I'm going
to have to solve." 9' Similarly, a judge from West Virginia
acknowledged that the spouses seeking dissolution were "in
need of a judicial remedy."196 Essentially, parties who enter
into a legal relationship in one state should have access to a
forum where disputes can be resolved in another.
B. What We Can Learn from the Cases Involving Dissolution
and Interstate Recognition of Civil Unions
Currently, there is little authority on interstate
recognition of same-sex marriages for the purpose of divorce.
An analysis of civil union jurisprudence regarding dissolution
193. Id. at 738-42 (citing In re KJB and JSP, No. CDCD 119660 (Woodbury
County Dist. Ct. Iowa, Nov. 14, 2003); In re M.G. and S.G., No. 02-D-292 (Fam.
Ct. W. Va., Jan. 3, 2003)).
194. Id. at 738-42 (citing In re KJB and JSP, No. CDCD 119660; In re M.G.
and S.G., No. 02-D-292).
195. Id. at 744 (citing Frank Santiago, Judge Revises His Ruling on Lesbians'
Divorce, DES MOINES REG., Dec. 31, 2003, at 3B). The Iowa opinion of a
Vermont civil union did not address subject matter jurisdiction or any contrary
Iowa statutes. See id. at 742-44. Although the Judge later admitted that he
did not realize the parties were of the same sex at the time of the decision, he
upheld the divorce. See id. After several plaintiffs brought suit against the
Judge on the basis that he lacked legal authority to dissolve the civil union, he
issued a revised opinion upholding his earlier decision. Alons v. Iowa Dist. Ct.,
698 N.W.2d 858 (Iowa 2005); see also Cox, supra note 10, at 743-44.
196. Cox, supra note 10, at 739-42 (citing In re M.G. and S.G., No. 02-D-292).
The court granted dissolution after determining that the West Virginia statute,
which purported to refuse recognition to same-sex marriages, did not apply to
the Vermont civil union at issue. Id. at 739-40. The court could have
determined that the statute encompassed a civil union but chose not to deny
relief. See W. VA. CODE § 48-2-603 (2001) ("A ... judicial proceeding of any
other state ... respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage under the law of the other state .. .shall not be given
effect by this state."). The court might have determined that a civil union falls
within this section because Vermont law treats civil unions the same as
marriages. Cox, supra note 10, at 740.
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and interstate recognition is beneficial because dissolution
and interstate recognition of civil unions present the same or
very similar issues for the courts as they would in the
marriage context.
Rosengarten v. Downes illustrates the illogical results
that can occur when a court refuses to perform a divorce
based on the underlying relationship.197 Glen Rosengarten, a
resident of Connecticut, filed an action to dissolve the civil
union that he and his partner, Peter Downes, a resident of
New York, entered into in Vermont.19 The appellate court
refused to dissolve the civil union because the union was not
a "marriage" within the meaning of the statute and therefore
could not be "dissolved" under Connecticut law.' 99 The court
looked at the issue of divorce jurisdiction only from the
perspective of marriage and concluded that the plaintiff could
not have entered into a marriage or civil union in
Connecticut. 20 0  Rosengarten shows the court's reluctance
about providing assistance to one of its own citizens in what
must have been a difficult and challenging situation.2 10' Glen
Rosengarten was not asking the court to validate his Vermont
civil union; he was simply asking for help dissolving his civil
202union. Using the incidental approach, the Rosengarten
Court could have recognized the marriage for the sole purpose
of performing the dissolution.2 3
In West Virginia and Iowa, courts have granted
dissolutions arising out of Vermont civil unions.20 4 In the
Iowa opinion granting dissolution, which did not address
subject matter jurisdiction nor any contrary Iowa statutes,
197. See generally Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct.
2002).
198. Id. at 172.
199. Id. at 172-75.
200. See Cox, supra note 10, at 730-35 (discussing the Rosengarten case).
201. See id. at 734.
202. Id. at 732-34. Professor Herma Hill Kay notes that even though the
only issue before the court was the dissolution of the civil union, "virtually all of
the analysis was devoted to [the propriety of] same-sex marriage rather than to
... divorce." Kay, supra note 177, at 88. Professor Kay also questioned why
Connecticut's marriage law should control whether a dissolution petition
involving a Vermont civil union was properly before the court and insists that
the focus should have been on the question of divorce. Id. at 88-89.
203. See Cox, supra note 10, at 735.
204. Id. at 738-42 (citing In re KJB and JSP, No. CDCD 119660 (Woodbury
County Dist. Ct. Iowa, Nov. 14, 2003); In re M.G. and S.G., No. 02-D-292 (Faro.
Ct. W. Va., Jan. 3, 2003)).
249
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
the court said, "we can't turn people away from our court
system and say we can't resolve your disputes .. . I clearly
look at this as a dispute between parties that in some way I'm
going to have to solve."2 °5
Similarly, a West Virginia court demonstrated that it
was willing to honor the relationship that its citizens had
entered into, acknowledging that the women were "in need of
a judicial remedy."206 The court granted the dissolution after
determining that the West Virginia statute, which purported
to refuse recognition to same-sex marriages, did not apply to
207thcorcolthe Vermont civil union at issue. Although the court could
have determined that the statute encompassed a civil
208th corunion, the court made clear that "the parties should not be
denied the relief they were seeking."209
Regarding interstate recognition, the trial court's
reasoning in Langan v. St. Vincent's Hospital, discussed
supra, is worth noting. 210 The plaintiff sought recognition of
his Vermont civil union in order to recover for the death of his
partner, under New York's wrongful death statute. 21' New
York had no affirmative law prohibiting civil unions, and thus
the court applied the "place of celebration" rule in finding
that the civil union was valid everywhere and will be
recognized in New York for purposes of the wrongful death
statute.1 2 The court then explicitly followed the incidental
approach, recognizing the civil union in New York for the sole
purpose of the wrongful death statute, and did not address
the validity of the underlying relationship in New York for all
205. Id. at 744 (citing Santiago, supra note 195).
206. Id. at 740 (citing In re M.G. and S.G., No. 02-D-292, I IX).
207. See id. at 739-40 (citing In re M.G. and S.G., No. 02-D-292, 1 1).
208. See W. VA. CODE § 48-2-603 (2001) ("A . . . judicial proceeding of any
other state.., respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage under the law of the other state . . .shall not be given
effect by this state."). The court might have determined that a civil union falls
within this section because Vermont law treats civil unions the same as
marriages. Cox, supra note 10, at 740.
209. Cox, supra note 10, at 740.
210. See Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sup. Ct. 2003),
rev'd, 802 N.Y.S.2d 476 (App. Div. 2005); see discussion supra Part II.E.
211. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
212. Id. at 414; see also discussion supra Part II.B (discussing that when the
state has no affirmative law regarding the underlying relationship, principles of
comity suggest that the state ought to respect the decision of sister states using
the "place of celebration" rule).
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purposes. 2" Additionally, the court looked to the purposes
behind Vermont's civil unions statute, finding that a "the civil
union is indistinguishable from marriage, notwithstanding
that the Vermont legislature withheld the title of marriage
from application to the union."214
The court concluded that the plaintiff would be entitled
to recover as the decedent's spouse in Vermont, then decided
that, based on the legislative intent behind New York's
wrongful death statute, a spouse in a sister state's common
law marriage would be recognized in New York.215 In short,
the trial court looked at the policy reasons behind the
incident at issue, and concluded that the civil union should be
recognized for the limited purpose of the wrongful death
action.21 6
C. How Chambers Should Have Been Decided
The Rhode Island Supreme Court had several options
before it that would have yielded a much more sensible result
when it decided Chambers.2 7 Because Rhode Island does not
have an affirmative prohibitory law, the court could have
used principles of comity to recognize the marriage.1 8
Alternatively, the court could have used the incidental
approach to grant a divorce but not full recognition of the
marriage.219 These alternatives would have provided divorces
to citizens of Rhode Island who were "in need of a judicial
remedy.2 20 Additionally, the court had some flexibility to use
an alternative option given the lack of prohibitory law against
same-sex marriage in Rhode Island, so long as recognition of
the marriage does not offend any public policy of the state.221
Even if the court was unwilling to fully recognize the
marriage, it was able to use the incidental approach to defer
213. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
214. Id. at 417-18.
215. Id. at 419-20; see discussion supra Part II.E.
216. See Cox, supra note 10, at 756-57.
217. See Joanna Grossman, The Rhode Island Supreme Court Denies a
Divorce to a Same-Sex Couple That Was Married in Massachusetts: Why This
Case Was Wrongly Decided, FINDLAW, Dec. 11, 2007,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20071211.html.
218. See supra Part II.B.
219. See supra Part II.C.
220. See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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questions regarding the validity of the marriage and focus
solely on what was being requested: a divorce.222
As the dissent acknowledged, it is illogical to analyze the
meaning of the term "marriage" circa 1961 because the
drafters of the Rhode Island marriage statute had not
anticipated or even contemplated same-sex marriage at that
time.223 Since 1961, many states have lifted their marriage
restrictions.224 Nothing suggests that a Rhode Island court
can only divorce a couple if their marriage would have been
legal in 1961.225 "The question . . . [should be] whether the
couple is now 'married' and [thus] entitled to seek
[divorce]."226 If the court had accepted the divorce petition, it
could have concluded that Rhode Island could grant full
recognition to the marriage,227 or grant limited recognition for
the sole purpose of performing the divorce.228
V. PROPOSAL
Because it is imperative that same-sex spouses be able to
divorce without having to overcome unreasonable burdens,
the incidental approach to marriage recognition should, at a
minimum, be the level of recognition applied to same-sex
marriages throughout the United States. Even if the forum
state has a mini-DOMA, that statute does not expressly
prohibit the use of an incidental approach for the purposes of
222. See supra Part II.C; see also Kay, supra note 177, at 88-89 (discussing
the Rosengarten case).
223. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 961-63, 971 (R.I. 2007) (Suttell,
J., dissenting); see also Grossman, supra note 217 (noting that the same-sex
marriage movement did not even exist-legally or as a social movement-in
1961 and supporting this conclusion by noting that no 1961 legislature made a
conscious decision to provide for the rights of same-sex couples when drafting
their marriage laws).
224. See Grossman, supra note 217. These changes have allowed marriages
between the mentally-disabled, marriages for those below a certain age, and
some states have abolished or modified their prohibitions on first-cousin
marriages. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See Cox, supra note 10 (citing In re M.G. and S.G., No. 02-D-292 (Fam.
Ct. W. Va. Jan. 3, 2003)).
228. See, e.g., In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, 188 P.2d 499, 502 (Cal. Ct. App.
1948) (recognizing polygamous marriage for inheritance purposes); Langan v.
St. Vincent's Hosp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sup. Ct. 2003), rev'd, 802 N.Y.S.2d 476
(App. Div. 2005) (recognizing civil union for purposes of a wrongful death suit).
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divorce. 29  In mini-DOMA states, courts can utilize the
incidental approach to avoid addressing the validity of the
underlying marriage.23 ° West Virginia and Iowa, despite the
existence of mini-DOMAs, have granted divorces based on
this rationale.23' Courts should be willing to provide a way
for their citizens to divorce when a marriage was performed
under the laws of another state.232 In states without mini-
DOMAs, courts are less constrained because there is no
express public policy against recognition of same-sex
233marriage.   These states can choose to use the incidental
approach to marriage or recognize the underlying marriage.
Although the legislative purpose and intent behind
divorce jurisdiction statutes will vary from state to state, the
family courts were intended as a comprehensive forum for
resolving issues concerning marital relations.234  Upon
reviewing the legislative history behind the Rhode Island
divorce jurisdiction statute, the dissenting judges in
Chambers, determined that the legislators surely would have
wanted to give all Rhode Island citizens a means of
determining their marital status and dissolving their
marriage. 231
Using the incidental approach, the court can view divorce
as an incident of marriage, analyze the policies behind the
incident at issue, 231 and then decide whether the marriage
229. But see Grossman, supra note 13, at 483. Grossman notes that there are
eleven states that statutorily bar an incidents approach, refusing to recognize
any claim, right, or incident arising out of a prohibited same-sex marriage. Id.
Those eleven states are Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. Id. at 447
n.71.
230. Although the cases cited do not expressly use the incidental approach
when dissolving a marriage deemed contrary to the laws of the forum state,
courts have dissolved such cases for other reasons. See Cox, supra note 10, at
738-42 (citing In re KJB and JSP, No. CDCD 119660 (Woodbury County Dist.
Ct. Iowa, Nov. 14, 2003) (granting dissolution of a civil union when contrary law
existed); In re M.G. and S.G., No. 02-D-292 (granting dissolution of a civil union
when contrary law existed)).
231. See id.
232. See id. at 736-46.
233. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 137-48; see also Grossman, supra
note 13, at 446-71.
234. See Chambers, 935 A.2d at 974 (Suttell, J., dissenting) (discussing the
purpose behind the Rhode Island divorce jurisdiction statute).
235. Id. at 971, 973-74.
236. For example, looking at the intended purpose and effect of the divorce
jurisdiction statute.
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should be recognized for the sole purpose of performing the
divorce.2 37 In a case where a couple petitions a court in their
home state, the couple likely owns property in that state that
must be divided and might require spousal support to be
awarded.238  Only a court with proper jurisdiction can
accomplish these tasks. It is disappointing that some courts
and states are reluctant to provide this assistance to its own
citizens, especially when it is infeasible or unreasonably
burdensome for a couple to obtain a divorce in the state where
the marriage was performed.239
VI. CONCLUSION
Margaret Chambers and Cassandra Ormiston are still in
a bind after the Supreme Court of Rhode Island decided their
case.240  Although decisions concerning same-sex divorce
jurisdiction will vary from state to state, courts have a variety
of ways to perform divorces for same-sex spouses, even if
recognition of the marriage is for the limited purpose of
performing the divorce. An incidental approach to marriage
recognition for the purpose of divorce can be utilized
throughout the United States, even in states that have mini-
DOMAs. Allowing all married citizens to divorce is consistent
with the notion that a family court should be a comprehensive
forum for resolving marital issues between citizens of that
state.2 41  All states should allow its citizens to divorce,
regardless of whether the marriage is a same-sex marriage.
237. See Cox, supra note 10, at 736-46; see also discussion supra Part II.C.
238. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 71-72.
239. See id. at 71-74.
240. See Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 974 (R.I. 2007) (Suttell, J.,
dissenting).
241. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 12, at 105; see also Cox, supra note 10, at
736-46.
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